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Abstract
Formal methods are powerful speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation techniques for establishing high conﬁdence in
safety-critical systems. However, there are a number of concerns about the use of evidence generated from
formal methods, when used in place of conventional testing, for satisfying certain certiﬁcation objectives. In
this paper, we address this issue by reviewing two certiﬁcation documents, DO-178B and the UK Defence
Standard 00-56, focusing on their approach to accepting formal analytical evidence. We also present a
generic goal-based safety case that can be instantiated to facilitate the justiﬁcation and presentation of
formal analysis to the certiﬁcation authorities. The safety case is based on claims about (1) the achievement
of the intents of the certiﬁcation objectives, (2) the demonstration of the trustworthiness of formal analysis
and (3) the practical feasibility of deploying formal methods within a speciﬁc project.
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1 Introduction
Formal methods have emerged as a potential technique for improving the assurance
and cost-eﬀectiveness of the speciﬁcation and assessment of safety-critical systems.
However, prescription in safety standards has hindered and complicated the adop-
tion of formal analytical techniques. The development of safety-critical systems,
particularly in the aerospace domain, is regulated according to strict certiﬁcation
guidelines. It is necessary to evaluate any new Validation and Veriﬁcation (V&V)
analytical approach, prior to employment, against applicable certiﬁcation require-
ments. Many standards, particularly the DO-178B guidance [2], consider testing to
be the preferred V&V technique for compliance.
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In this paper, we examine two diﬀerent certiﬁcation documents, DO-178B and
the UK Defence Standard 00-56 [10], and the way each approaches formal analysis.
DO-178B is known to give precedence for testing evidence while Defence Stan 00-56
considers analytical methods to oﬀer the strongest form of evidence. However, both
standards, regardless of their conservatism or preference towards formal analytical
evidence, require the submission of a reasoned justiﬁcation as to why and how formal
analysis achieves the certiﬁcation goals. To this end, we present a generic safety
case argument that can be instantiated to facilitate the justiﬁcation and presentation
of formal analysis to the certiﬁcation authorities. A safety case is deﬁned in UK
Defence Standard 00-56 as [2]:
“A structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a com-
pelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given application
in a given operating environment.”
The safety case that we present is based upon claims concerning (1) the achieve-
ment of the intents of the certiﬁcation objectives, (2) the demonstration of the
trustworthiness of formal analysis and (3) the practical feasibility of deploying for-
mal methods within a speciﬁc project. The safety case is documented using the
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [7] — a graphical argumentation notation which
explicitly represents the individual elements of any assurance argument (require-
ments, claims, evidence and context) and the relationships that exist between these
elements.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 examine
the consideration of formal analytical evidence in DO-178B and Defence Standard
00-56. The safety case concept is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 explores the
role of GSN in communicating safety case arguments. In Section 6, we present a
generic GSN argument for the justiﬁcation of formal analysis. The paper concludes
with a summary in Section 7.
2 Formal Analysis in DO-178B
The use of formal methods is addressed in DO-178B in Section 12 — “Additional
Considerations”. DO-178B acknowledges the strength of formal methods in produc-
ing “an implementation whose operational behavior is known with conﬁdence to be
within a deﬁned domain” [2]. It even goes further to declare that the deployment of
formality is equivalent to thorough analysis, as it not only detects requirements, de-
sign and code errors but also eliminates them. However, it subsequently undermines
the aforementioned statements by declaring that formal methods are complemen-
tary to testing, and hence indirectly implying that evidence generated from formal
methods cannot be used as the sole means for compliance with veriﬁcation ob-
jectives, speciﬁcally those objectives concerning the veriﬁcation of the executable
object code.
The high level of prescription in DO-178B is a key hurdle for obtaining certiﬁca-
tion credit with the use of formal methods, speciﬁcally with regard to the veriﬁcation
process. DO-178B explicitly requires the performance of three levels of ‘tests’ (Fig-
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Fig. 1. Testing Process in DO-178B[2]
ure 1): low-level tests, software integration tests and hardware/software integration
tests — rather than ‘veriﬁcation’. Normal-range and robustness test cases should
be developed for each requirement addressed by these tests. All test cases should be
generated from the requirements. The quality of testing is judged against two cover-
age measures: requirements coverage and structural coverage. While the ﬁrst type
of coverage determines which requirements were not tested, the latter determines
how well the test cases exercised the code structure.
Testing is a powerful method of veriﬁcation. In particular, testing is the dom-
inant technique for software/hardware integration veriﬁcation due to the need to
exercise the software on the target platform. However, formal analytical techniques
are now well established and proven and can replace testing for certain applications,
at least for the veriﬁcation of the software at the unit and software integration
level. Current DO-178B objectives make it diﬃcult to claim credit for the use of
formal methods, as the objectives are very speciﬁc to testing (e.g. because of ob-
jectives formulated as “Test coverage of high-level requirements is achieved” rather
than “Veriﬁcation coverage of high-level requirements is achieved”). One aim of
Sub-Group 6 in the EUROCAE WG71 and RTCA SC205 committees developing
DO-178C is to try to abstract the veriﬁcation objectives [9]. If successful, formal
analysis would become a possible means for compliance as long as it can be shown
to be trustworthy and directly targeting the certiﬁcation objectives.
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3 Formal Analysis in UK Defence Standard 00-56
The UK Defence Standard 00-56, Issue 4 [2], adopts a diﬀerent approach to safety
certiﬁcation. Def Stan 00-56 is both evidence-based and goal-oriented and focuses
on the strength, rigour and coverage of evidence with regard to safety requirements.
Defence Stan 00-56 lists the following types of evidence as acceptable [2]:
a. Direct evidence from analysis
b. Direct evidence from demonstration (testing and/or operation), including quanti-
tative evidence
c. Direct evidence extracted from the review process
d. Process evidence showing good practice in development, maintenance and opera-
tion
e. Qualitative evidence for good design, including expert testimony.
Unlike DO-178B, where testing evidence takes the front seat, Def Stan 00-56
gives precedence to analytical evidence. Nonetheless, in order to obtain credit for
the use of analysis as the primary means for compliance, the analytical methods
should be accompanied with supporting backing information, including:
Reasoned justiﬁcation — addressing the use of analysis in the context of a spe-
ciﬁc application, including known limitations
Full documentation — addressing the conﬁguration consistency, repeatability
and veriﬁability of analysis
Tool qualiﬁcation — addressing the rigour of analysis through automation and
tool support
Personnel competency — justifying staﬀ competency with regard to performing
analysis and using tools, if available
Suitability of models — addressing the correctness and the justiﬁcation of the
selection of models, speciﬁcally the ability of the models to represent certain
aspects of the actual system such as timing, resource usage, run-time errors and
functional properties.
Analytical evidence therefore takes precedence in Def Stan 00-56 as long as it is
accompanied with a reasoned justiﬁcation regarding the analytical method’s trust-
worthiness and practicality. In DO-178B, analytical evidence may be considered a
means for compliance if the certiﬁcation authorities are provided with a compelling
argument concerning its eﬀectiveness in satisfying the veriﬁcation objectives — tra-
ditionally achieved by testing. This can only be achieved after agreement with the
certiﬁcation authorities. Gaining such agreement can have the potential to prolong
the process of obtaining approval.
In short, the use of analysis as a means for compliance, in both DO-178B and
Def Stand 00-56, involves the submission of an argument and evidence to substan-
tiate any claims about the integrity and eﬀectiveness of the analytical methods.
In essence, the safety engineers are required to submit a safety case in support of
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The Defence in Depth principle (P65) has been
addressed in this system through the provision of
the following:
• Multiple physical barriers between hazard
source and the environment (see Section X)
• A protection system to prevent breach of these
barriers and to mitigate the effects of a
barrier being breached (see Section Y)
Fig. 2. An Example Textual Argument
For hazards associated with warnings, the
assumptions of [7] Section 3.4 associated with the
requirement to present a warning when no equipment
failure has occurred are carried forward. In
particular, with respect to hazard 17 in section
5.7 [4] that for test operation, operating limits
will need to be introduced to protect against
the hazard, whilst further data is gathered to
determine the extent of the problem.
Fig. 3. The Problems of Textual Safety Arguments
analysis. In the next two sections, we introduce the safety case concept, explor-
ing the role of the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) in communicating safety case
arguments.
4 Safety Case Arguments
Safety arguments are typically communicated in existing safety cases through free
text. Figure 2 shows a fragment of a safety argument communicated using free text.
The text describes clearly how a safety requirement (P65) has been interpreted and
achieved in the system. It also clearly provides references to where the evidence
supporting the lower level statements can be found.
Well-structured approaches to expressing safety arguments in text can be ef-
fective. However, there are problems experienced when text is the only medium
available for expressing complex arguments. The text shown in Figure 3, taken
from a real industrial safety case (with identiﬁcation of the target application hid-
den), illustrates some of these problems.
The text shown in Figure 3 is unclear and is poorly structured. Not all engineers
responsible for producing safety cases write clear, well-structured English. Conse-
quently, the meaning of the text, and therefore the structure of the safety argument,
can be ambiguous and unclear. Cross-references, of the type shown in Figure 3, are
often necessary given the role of the safety case as an integrator of evidence. How-
ever, multiple cross-references in text can be awkward and can disrupt the ﬂow of
the main argument.
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Fig. 4. Principal Symbols of GSN
In the context of developing, agreeing, and maintaining the safety arguments
within the safety case, the biggest problem with the use of free text is in ensur-
ing that all stakeholders involved share the same understanding of the argument.
Without a clear and shared understanding of the argument, safety case manage-
ment is often an ineﬃcient and ill-deﬁned activity. The following section describes
a structured technique that has been developed to address the problems of clearly
expressing and presenting safety arguments.
5 The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)
The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [7] — a graphical argumentation notation —
explicitly represents the individual elements of any safety argument (requirements,
claims, evidence and context) and (perhaps more signiﬁcantly) the relationships
that exist between these elements (i.e. how individual requirements are supported
by speciﬁc claims, how claims are supported by evidence and the assumed context
that is deﬁned for the argument). The principal symbols of the notation are shown
in Figure 4 (with example instances of each concept).
When the elements of the GSN are linked together in a network they are de-
scribed as a ‘goal structure’. The principal purpose of any goal structure is to show
how goals (claims about the system) are successively broken down into sub-goals
until a point is reached where claims can be supported by direct reference to avail-
able evidence (solutions). As part of this decomposition, using the GSN it is also
possible to make clear the argument strategies adopted (e.g. adopting a quanti-
tative or qualitative approach), the rationale for the approach and the context in
which goals are stated (e.g. the system scope or the assumed operational role).
Figure 5 shows an example goal structure. In this structure, as in most, there
exist ‘top level’ goals — statements that the goal structure is designed to support. In
this case, “C/S (Control System) Logic is fault free”, is the (singular) top level goal.
Beneath the top level goal or goals, the structure is broken down into sub-goals,
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S2
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'Hand trapped in 
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command error'
Sn4
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directed test 
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Fig. 5. Example Goal Structure
either directly or, as in this case, indirectly through a strategy. The two argument
strategies put forward as a means of addressing the top level goal in Figure 5 are
“Argument by satisfaction of all C/S (Control System) safety requirements” and
“Argument by omission of all identiﬁed software hazards”. These strategies are then
substantiated by ﬁve sub-goals. At some stage in a goal structure, a goal statement
is put forward that need not be broken down and can be clearly supported by
reference to some evidence. In this case, the goal “Unintended Closing of press
after PoNR (Point of No Return) can only occur as a result of component failure”,
is supported by direct reference to the solutions “Fault tree cutsets. . . ” and “Hazard
Directed Testing Results”. Within Europe, GSN has been adopted by a growing
number of companies within safety-critical industries for the presentation of safety
arguments within safety cases. The following list includes some of the applications
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of GSN to date:
• Euroﬁghter Aircraft Avionics Safety Justiﬁcation
• Hawk Aircraft Safety Justiﬁcation
• U.K. Ministry of Defence Site Safety Justiﬁcations
• U.K. Dorset Coast Railway Re-signalling Safety Justiﬁcation
• Submarine Propulsion Safety Justiﬁcations
• Safety Justiﬁcation of UK Military Air Traﬃc Management Systems
• London Underground Jubilee Line Extension Safety Justiﬁcation
• Swedish Air Traﬃc Control Applications.
The key beneﬁt experienced by those companies adopting GSN is that it im-
proves the comprehension of the safety argument amongst all of the key project
stakeholders (i.e. system developers, safety engineers, independent assessors and
certiﬁcation authorities). In turn, this has improved the quality of the debate and
discussion amongst the stakeholders and has reduced the time taken to reach agree-
ment on the argument approaches being adopted.
6 A Generic Argument for the Justiﬁcation of Formal
Analysis
Unlike traditional means for compliance (e.g. testing), the approval of formal anal-
ysis as a primary means for compliance depends on the submission of a compelling
safety/certiﬁcation argument that provides evidence that a formal technique can
achieve, and later on has achieved, certain certiﬁcation objectives. In this section,
we explore some fundamental elements of the justiﬁcation required to provide the
context for formal analysis and document the logical dependencies of these elements
in a GSN-based argument.
The justiﬁcation of formal analysis is often carried out by comparison to testing.
Arguing that a formal analytical technique is “at least as convincing as” testing
oﬀers one potential means for generating a compelling safety certiﬁcation argument
[4]. This approach entails the following activities:
(i) Eliciting the objectives and arguments in support of the testing techniques as
presented in the standards
(ii) Developing an argument that is “at least as convincing as” the testing argu-
ment, which demonstrates that the new analytical technique(s) achieve(s) the
same objectives as those achieved by testing
(iii) Arguing that it is feasible to implement the proposed analytical technique(s).
However, the main hurdle is extracting the real intent and rationale behind the
certiﬁcation objectives that the argument needs to satisfy. For example, the DO-
178B document does not provide a published rationale for the development of the
guidance. This is partly because the guidance was developed by the consensus of
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Fig. 6. Generic Argument for the Justiﬁcation of New Analytical Technique
257 companies and organisations, based on industrial best practices.
In this paper we complement the above approach by tackling three fundamental
aspects of the justiﬁcation of formal analysis which should be covered by a certiﬁ-
cation argument, namely:
• Elicitation of the ‘rationale and intent’ of V&V objectives, and showing how they
can be satisﬁed by formal analysis
• Demonstration of the trustworthiness of formal analysis
• Demonstration of the feasibility and practicality of employing formal analysis
using available project resources, e.g. tools and personnel.
The above aspects are realised in a generic GSN-based safety argument. The
argument is presented in Figure 6. The top-level goal (G1) of the argument is that
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the method is safely implementable. One of the assumptions is that the formal
analytical method is not explicitly addressed in the applicable standards (A1). The
strategy for justifying the safety of the method depends on three sub-claims:
• The method meets the certiﬁcation objectives (G2): based on the validity (G5)
and satisfaction (G6) of the certiﬁcation objectives
• The method is trustworthy (G3): based on the mathematical soundness (G7) and
practical reliability (G8) of the method
• The method is feasible to implement (G4): based on tool support (G9), staﬀ
competency (G11) and usability (G10) of the method.
The symbol ‘’ underneath the sub-goals G5, G6, G7, G8, G9, and G10 indicate
that such goals require further decomposition. This decomposition depends on the
speciﬁc characteristics of each formal analytical method. For example, the sub-goal
‘Empirical case studies show practical integrity of methods X’ (G8) can be decom-
posed further based on empirical results obtained from case studies, uncovering both
the strengths and limitations of a formal method.
In the subsequent subsections, we discuss ways in which the intent of the cer-
tiﬁcation objectives can be elicited, factors which should be considered to show
the trustworthiness of formal analysis, and ﬁnally project attributes that should be
demonstrated in order to show the practical feasibility of using formal analysis.
6.1 Rationale and Intent of V&V Objectives
In order to substantiate G2 “Method {X} satisﬁes certiﬁcation objectives”, it is im-
portant to elicit the rationale behind the certiﬁcation objectives in order to show
that formal analysis addresses the intent of the certiﬁcation objective (i.e. address-
ing the ‘spirit’ of the objectives rather than the actual wording). This is particularly
important for veriﬁcation objectives that are speciﬁc to testing as it may appear
contradictory to claim the satisfaction of a testing objective by formal analytical
evidence. A more reasonable approach is to claim the satisfaction of the intent of a
testing objective by formal analysis.
However, many standards, particularly DO-178B, do not provide a published
rationale for the development of the objectives and means for compliance. Therefore,
we recommend that the intent and rationale for the V&V objectives, particularly
testing objectives, should be elicited through the following means:
(i) Referring to published ‘guidelines’ , e.g. DO-248B [3], FAA Advisory Circu-
lars (CA), Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), and Technical Standard Orders
(TSO).
(ii) Developing an argument, based on information revealed in the guidance, which
shows the ‘logical ﬂow’ involved in justifying the signiﬁcance and contribution
of the V&V techniques (i.e. developing an argument for testing on the behalf
of the certiﬁcation authorities or guidance authors [4]).
(iii) Modelling and analysing the ‘development and assessment process’, as speciﬁed
in the certiﬁcation guidance, showing the ﬂow of information, assumptions and
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dependencies between diﬀerent activities in the overall lifecycle.
The above three approaches are complementary. For example, DO-178B is not
a standalone document. Associated guidelines are continually being updated. DO-
178B applicants have to get agreement from the certiﬁcation authorities on the
guidelines to be used. Additional guidelines for the application of DO-178B, for
instance, can be obtained from technical certiﬁcation reports such as DO-248B [3].
A complementary approach to eliciting the intent of the testing objectives is by
formulating an argument in support of testing, based solely on information available
in the guidelines and guidance. The logical ﬂow of the testing argument should
show logical interdependencies between a testing technique and other pre-requisite
or post-requisite techniques. The input of the testing technique may depend on the
output data and validity of other V&V activities.
Modelling and analysing the lifecycle processes, as speciﬁed in the standards,
oﬀers another approach to identifying dependencies between testing and the rest
of the development activities, and hence potentially inferring the rationale for a
recommended or mandated testing technique. In fact, DO-178B insists on evaluat-
ing the impact of any alternative means of compliance on the overall development
lifecycle process and data:
“An alternative method cannot be considered in isolation from the suite of software
development processes. The eﬀort for obtaining certiﬁcation credit of an alterna-
tive method is dependent on the software level and the impact of the alternative
method on the software life cycle processes.”
6.2 Arguing about the Trustworthiness of Formal Analysis
The claim “Method {X} is trustworthy” (G3) in the GSN argument in Figure 6
addresses the integrity of the formal analytical method. The justiﬁcation of for-
mal analysis should demonstrate both the theoretical soundness and the practical
integrity of the formal analytical method. For example, if a formal technique ad-
dresses ﬂoating-point arithmetic run-time exceptions, the soundness of this tech-
nique may be demonstrated against the requirements of the IEEE Standard for
Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic (IEEE 754). The soundness of a method may
also be undermined by the failure to express, formally, certain properties that are
assumed to be addressed by the method (e.g. functional and timing properties).
Successful industrial case studies are also important as they have the potential
to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of formal analysis through generating empirical
data. It is necessary for the case studies to show how the formal technique inte-
grates consistently with other design and assessment techniques. These case studies
should be based on real safety-critical systems. Further, the case studies should be
carried out in the context of the assumed authenticity of the selected formal models.
Any known limitations of the formal analytical technique should also be communi-
cated, which may be speciﬁc to the context of a project. For example, the ability
to demonstrate correspondence between the mathematical model and the software
behaviour at run-time is critical [5]. Otherwise, conﬁdence in formal analysis would
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be seriously undermined. Any formal model will not be useful, and may even be
misleading and dangerous, unless its representation provides a satisfactory reﬂection
of the actual system. The actual system encompasses a large number of concepts,
assumptions and relationships. However, generally only a small portion of these
elements controls the structure and behaviour of the actual system. As a result, a
formal model should focus on capturing these prevailing elements in order to reduce
the gap between the assumed and the actual system. The validation of the authen-
ticity of a model is undeniably a universal concept, applying to most techniques,
regardless of whether they are formal or not. However, this is of a particular impor-
tance for formal analysis as the resulting analyses may be used as the sole means
for compliance, without the need to exercise the software at runtime. Therefore,
unless a high level of conﬁdence can be achieved regarding the faithfulness of the
formal model, some testing may still be required.
6.3 Demonstrating the Feasibility of Formal Analysis
The previous sections address the need to formulate a compelling certiﬁcation ar-
gument which can provide strong, relevant and suﬃcient evidence that a formal
analytical technique satisﬁes the certiﬁcation objectives. However, there are always
concerns about the practicality of applying formal analytical approaches. There is a
misconception that formal speciﬁcation and analysis are a pure theoretical exercise
despite the many successful industrial implementations [6].
The certiﬁcation authorities need to be assured that the deployment of an al-
ternative formal analytical technique overcomes the practical limitations that have
been traditionally associated with the implementation of formal methods in large-
scale and critical systems, such as [1], [5], [6], [8] :
• Poor tool support
• Poor integration with other techniques
• Inadequate formal mathematical skills and training
• Insuﬃcient industrial examples
• Focus on cost reduction rather than safety improvement.
The safety case argument in support of an alternative formal analytical technique
should rebut known misconceptions about formal analysis (G4 “Method {X} is
feasible to implement”). The claim about the feasibility of implementing an analysis
method is important in order to show that the method is correctly used, given the
resources allocated to the project. For example, the ﬁrst three concerns above can
be tackled by the development of a qualiﬁed tool that (1) automates the formal
analysis process and (2) integrates well with other development and veriﬁcation
tools. It is necessary for the tool to automate and hide formality, as much as
possible, and hence minimise the level of formal mathematical skills expected to be
exhibited by the developers.
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7 Summary
In this paper, we have reviewed two certiﬁcation documents, DO-178B and the UK
Defence Standard 00-56, focusing on their approach to accepting formal analytical
evidence. We have also presented a generic safety case that can be instantiated
to facilitate the presentation and justiﬁcation of formal analysis. The safety case
is based on claims about (1) the achievement of the intents of the certiﬁcation
objectives, (2) the demonstration of the trustworthiness of formal analysis and (3)
the practical feasibility of deploying formal methods within a speciﬁc project.
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